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The Psychic Life: A Life in Time 
Psychoanalysis and Culture 
Julia Kristeva 
University of Paris-Diderot 
Last year I published an autobiographical text in the form of interviews 
with a young psychologist entitled Je me voyage.1 The title’s neologism gives a 
nod to my foreign status in the French language which has largely determined 
my psychosexual positioning in research and in writing; the psychic 
experience has been central to my life’s trajectory (which I will not elaborate 
on here.)  In my familial context, culture constituted a world that made life 
liveable —and I experienced life, due to the importance accorded to language, 
as survival, as an intimate resistance and an inherent creativity in social time.   
 Freud’s revolutionary theory of the unconscious and the 
transference/countertransference relationship proposes an overhaul of the 
dichotomies inherited from metaphysics:  body and mind, animal and social, 
nature and culture.  This bold reshaping of culture arouses fear not only in 
relation to the social contract, which rejects it, given that it is based on and 
structured by dualities, but also in relation to the bipartism of our institutions 
and the foundational "disciplines" of the educational and cultural system.  
Psychoanalysts themselves, who practice and refine the reshaping, contribute 
to the perpetuation of this metaphysical inheritance by isolating themselves 
in many cases from what is at stake in culture.  I have called into question 
linguistic models, constituted by and emerging out of the signifier/signified 
and their grammatical and logical articulation.  Was it my transgenerational 
history, my crossing of boundaries within and outside of myself, which led 
me to do this?  It seemed to me important to shake up their grid, cut off as it 
is from the corporal experience.  It was my practice of 
transference/countertransference and the influence of Klein’s and 
Winnicott’s work as well as that of André Green on the psychosomatic drives 
that motivated me to do so.2  I then developed an approach to literary creation 
and, in fact, all discourses, that stemmed from a language model conceived 
not as a "structure" but as a signifiance, that is, as a process with two 
modalities, the semiotic and the symbolic.  By symbolic I am referring to the 
psyche, constituted by language--its morphologics, syntax, logic--while the 
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semiotic is pre- or trans-language:  the infraverbal traces of drives, affects, and 
sensations which impregnate, transform, and sometimes absorb the verbal.3  
 From the outset I have addressed these zones of interference between 
nature and culture:  the flesh of words.  Freud himself, evoking Greek 
mythology and the European Renaissance, from Leonardo da Vinci to Stefan 
Zweig, said that poets "preceded" us on the royal road of psychoanalysis.  This 
wandering Jew, son of the Enlightenment, inherited from his Jewish tradition 
the invitation to listen in order to interpret.  Convinced of the universal 
importance of his discovery, he was able to open it up to history, and beyond 
the crises of European culture, to the human itself, to Homo sapiens understood 
as Homo religiosus.  The « primal horde,” “totem and taboo,” “Egypt and 
Moses,” « war and peace,” and « civilisation and its discontents” followed.  
Beyond Sigmund Freud, the man, this intrinsically religious and political 
anchoring in cultural memory constitutes the very structure of the 
psychoanalytical position and speech, both with and through the techniques 
Freud bequeathed.  My efforts in the human sciences inscribes itself in this 
lineage, consciously or unconsciously, when I attempt to introduce Freudian 
interpretation into the theoretical models of today, to open them up to the 
confrontation with the unconscious and vice versa.  Yet, this concern to perfect 
psychoanalytic tools, to make them more relevant in the face of the "new 
maladies of the soul" 4, tense traumatic situations, "borderline" conditions, 
and other "unbindings," also carries with it the danger of becoming overly 
involved in highly technical metapsychologies and thus cut off from current 
social and anthropological mutations.   
Psychoanalysis as Discovery or Rediscovery 
 Psychoanalysis is a constant reinvention—attentive to its foundations 
and history—on condition that it is continuously re-embodied in the 
subjectivity of the analyst, herself evolving in the counter-transferential 
relation with her patient: the pöetics of interpretation bear witness to this 
alchemy.  It's a passion that is open both to self-analysis and to the time of 
history into which the timelessness of the unconscious erupts.  The 
“framework of the cure” is inscribed in historical movement and if analysts 
forget this, they fail to address psychic life.  The psychic life is always situated 
in time.  In this sense, the question of culture, past, present, and to come, is 
consubstantial with psychic life, understood not as a "device" but as a life 
whose finite nature is embedded in history.  My personal trajectory through 
its challenges, traumas, pleasures, failures, rewards, etc., has taught me this.  
I’ve had moments of enlightened understanding, rebounds and luck—or 
rather chance, as seen through the lens of game theory, not unlike "objective 
chance" in the "dialectic" of history.  
 In my familial constellation, my mother was very present, while at the 
same time leaving ample room for my father.  Modest, warm, she was a 
Darwinian scientist by training.  My father, raised by his adoptive mother, 
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was a believer, very literary, and tender—in the feminine sense of this drive.  
Everything was in place for psychic bisexuality to develop.  There was another 
historical event, as random as it was fortunate:  Alphabet Day, celebrated on 
May 24th in Bulgaria, which the brothers Cyril and Methodius invented twelve 
centuries ago.  The cultural and educational milieus went on parade.  
Everyone sported a letter. I incarnated words, names, sentences.  I loved this 
ritual, linked to history, to culture, which celebrated a kind of transfusion of 
the person into writing. 
 It was another piece of luck — or rather chance — to discover Freud and 
psychoanalysis.  Confronting his current debasement, I emphasise in my 
lectures and writings that going into analysis is an internal experience 
enabling a person to situate herself in openness.  I explain to those I supervise 
that in the transmission of the analytical act, we are not working in the 
margins but on the tangent between our knowledge and the vagaries of 
history.  The technical framework of analysis is tangential to historical 
movement.  It is of course necessary to maintain the counterphobic method of 
the framework and theory, given that it enables connections to be made by 
reconstituting narcissism and the ego ideal in the cure’s working through 
process.  At the same time, it is indispensable to open the ear up to what the 
analysand experiences in the here and now.  Our work is not to meet the social 
demand but to hear the social malaise.  Today, civilisation’s malaise resides 
in this threat weighing on psychic space, on “inner life.”  It’s up to analysts to 
find a relevant and acceptable language to pave the way for subjectivation in 
the transference; but it is equally crucial for us to be heard “outside of our 
framework.”   This presents a double challenge because the analyst must show 
psychic flexibility while maintaining the technical rigour of the framework.  If 
she is fine-tuned in her accompaniment of the patient, she is able to detect 
new symptoms and generate new concepts.  Yes, research does exist in 
psychoanalysis though it is not sufficiently understood: it explores borderline 
conditions, the early mother-child relationship, even autism and now 
“radicalisation.”  There is also the matter of translating the technical side of 
our savoir-faire and providing key elements of this inner experience we 
witness to other caregivers—psychotherapists, relaxation therapists, physical 
therapists, etc. — so that they can have a clearer grasp of the social malaise 
and thus help their patients, who, although not in analysis, might find other 
ways of accessing their inner lives.  Squeezed by accelerated time and 
hyperconnection, the interior life becomes suspended in a stressed and 
stressful daily existence, dominated by media images which encapsulate and 
threaten to destroy all inner experience.  How do we deal with this constant 
incitement to partake in the Spectacle, exhibitionism, narcissism, social media, 
selfies?  This widely shared behaviour is a major social phenomenon that begs 
to be analysed.  In what ways is it both toxic and liberating, in contact with the 
violence of trauma and desire?  To problematise the present, to find an audible 
language, and to occupy a freely determined space, such are the challenges 
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psychoanalysts must face.  We have to maintain both poles firmly—new 
techniques and a double anchoring in both subjectivity and culture.    
Psychoanalysis as a Translation of Traumas and Their 
Trajectory 
 Allow me a little detour through Europe:  it's a very fragile place for 
many reasons and especially because twenty-three languages are spoken 
there.  Translation is the European language.  As a professor directing the 
theses of foreign students and as a psychoanalyst working with patients 
whose mother tongue is not French, I have been observing a psychic 
renaissance expressed in polylingualism and the act of translating.  Given that 
both analyst and analysand are socio-historical agents, interpreting the 
unconscious of the analysand, that is, what he says unawares, constitutes a 
translation.  One bets on the translatability of traumas and thus on their 
trajectory, their working-through. 
 Bringing this knowledge of the psyche to light on the social and cultural 
stage is not easy.   It falls to each of us to make use of the rigorous tools of our 
respective fields, to confront the social crises (identity, the need to believe, 
populism, fundamentalism) and the new social agents (adolescents, different 
sexual orientations and reproductive modalities).   It's a question not so much 
of an engagement as a co-presence, providing a neighbouring framework (of 
the cure) and its socio-historical environment.  One begins with the relevant 
interpretation in the framework, then its transmission, understood as a 
translation-interpretation of historical change, addressed to the social body in 
movement. 
Three Anthropological Changes 
 Never has humanity known an anthropological mutation as radical and 
widespread as the one we are experiencing today.  Technology moves 
forward with dizzying speed.  Communication has never been so global, 
extraordinary in its diversity and heterogeneity.  
1)  Our relation to time is both hyper accelerated and suspended.  It 
becomes suspended in melancholy or in borderline conditions, and also in 
drug addiction and jihadism.  It's a time of sacrifice, a maniacal narcissistic 
exaltation which literally explodes both the traumatisers and the traumatised.  
But it's also a suspension of jouissance, lived out as the drive-based avidity 
experienced by the consumers that we are.  We can equally consider this 
suspension in a more abstract, mathematical way, given that cosmologists 
claim time doesn't exist in interstellar space, in the multiverse and other dark 
matter.  Never has temporality been so paradoxical and yet accessible.  But 
who has access to these different facets if not the analyst and her analytic 
process where the dynamics of transference, repetition and finitude inscribe 
themselves in a beginning, without end? This process encompasses 
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transgenerational clusters as well as reticular adaptation fantasies and flashes 
of sharp idealisations along with sacrificial hallucinatory holograms.  Only 
analysts have access to all of the above expressed through singular 
experiences.  That is to say, by way of an extended rationality aligned with 
analytic rationality.  Philosophers, ethnologists and politicians simply do not 
operate on this level.  In my last novel, The Enchanted Clock, I try to sublimate 
in fiction these complex subjective temporalities.5  
2)  The reordering of sexual difference.   Psychic bisexuality is omnipresent 
but articulated in different ways.  I ended my essay on Feminine Genius6 by 
affirming that there are more than two sexes and that we invent our sex in our 
intimate life:  this process is always a creative act.  The end of an analysis 
opens up the capacity to make connections, to play, and, adopting Winnicott's 
words, to recreate one's psychosexuality continually, with or without a 
partner, with Love, or in the shadow of that "big fat Love," to quote the great 
Colette whose connection to plants and animals enabled her to thrive.  The 
process occurs as well in the caring professions, like psychoanalysis.  
Although repression also returns with galloping speed, despite and alongside 
marriage equality and other praise for "enjoyment without restraint," there is 
in addition the tendency to free sexuality from inhibition by restoring its 
creativity, and psychoanalysis participates in this movement, which plumbs 
the depths of psychic and trans-psychic structures inaccessible to the 
sociologist, anthropologist, or philosopher. 
3)  The third change has been that of "the religious."  The current global 
resurgence of religion came to me as a surprise:  I consider myself one of the 
rare atheists remaining on earth.  As a psychoanalyst, I observe the 
importance of what I call the "need to believe," a universal and pre-religious 
anthropological need, which I examine through the lens of what Freud calls a 
cathexis—Besetzung in German.  The need to believe and the desire to know, never 
one without the other, are the universal conditions for human beings to be 
able to talk and relate to each other.  Psychoanalysis is alone in its ability to 
lift the denial weighing upon this need to believe.  It does so in order to take the 
measure of the sexual dimension in it and to interpret it in the transferential 
and counter-transferential relationship.  Without compromise.  
The Need to Believe 
 One cannot be content to say that Freud reduces religion to an illusion 
and a source of neurosis, and that the analytic experience itself is not a 
stranger to "belief" in the broad sense of the term.7  Steeped in the Jewish 
tradition, but atheist, and conscious of the anthropological place of the 
religious, Freud is at the same time a child of the Enlightenment.  According 
to Sartre, atheism is a "cruel and long-term experience."  In Moses and 
Monotheism, Freud makes Moses an Egyptian:  this is a cruel deconstruction 
of the arrival of Judaism, making Egyptian monotheism its starting point.  
One can also read this as an invitation to inscribe the Torah in the history of 
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humanity.  An intransigent atheist, Freud underlines in "The Resistances to 
Psychoanalysis" that "Nor is it perhaps entirely a matter of chance that the 
first advocate of psycho-analysis was a Jew.  To profess belief in this new 
theory [notice the ‘need to believe’ in this reflection, which I would call 
testamentary], called for a certain degree of readiness to accept a situation of 
solitary opposition--a situation with which no one is more familiar than a Jew."8 
 In the spirit of the Enlightenment—Goethe and Diderot—he joins 
Nietzsche who proclaims that it remains for us to place “a big question mark 
at the most serious place,” that is, God, precisely, but also all identity, value, 
or system of meaning.  The Future of an Illusion and Moses and Monotheism 
invite us to pursue reevaluating this religious cultural legacy, with which 
secularisation cut the strings.  Certain analysts have responded, for instance, 
Fethi Benslama with Islam, Daniel Sibony with Judaism.  For my part, I have 
probed Catholic mysticism with Teresa of Avila’s texts as the point of 
departure.9  
Adolescence and Unbinding 
 In my article of January 2016, “How Can One be Jihadist?”10, following 
the killings in France (Charlie Hebdo and at the Bataclan), I raise the question 
of how to stop the unbinding when adolescent ideality illness leads to 
nihilism.  At the Home for the Adolescent (Maison de Solenn), at Cochin 
Hospital, a co-ed and multicultural team in enthnopsychiatry admits young 
people struggling with depression and a solitary destructivity which they 
cannot put words to or share with anyone.  They are at risk for suicide 
attempts, anorexia, and radicalisation.  Those prone to radicalisation repress 
the injury of exclusion while appearing “normal”; they are ready to take off 
for jihad.  Without judging or diagnosing, the team listens, aware of the need 
to understand and interpret religious memory.  My seminar on "The Need to 
Believe" (first at the University of Paris-VII and for three years with Professor 
Marie-Rose Moro at the Maison de Solenn) flushed out harmful behaviour--
the faithful Muslim submitting to "mass orthodoxy"11 (see Abdennour Bidar) 
which, by ignoring the individual, by reducing women to prey, spreads a 
culture of death throughout Islam.  The intense desire to transcend oneself, so 
common to adolescents with their frustrations, can, in certain circumstances, 
be perverted into "radical evil."  By listening to them, we can help adolescents 
in the grips of "an ideality illness" succeed in "finding flesh in words" and 
"thinking on their own" in an intercultural space to regain confidence and 
become invested in the desire to live.   
 I'm not setting up an opposition between the analytic cure and the 
therapeutic practices of social work.  I'm putting them side-by-side.  To speak 
of our findings in psychoanalytical practice to the larger public requires a 
discursive flexibility that takes into account the listener's ability to 
understand.  
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 At the Maison de Solenn, the therapeutic container is provided by the 
intercultural ethno-psychiatric team while I offer a Seminar open to the 
caregiving staff who have the desire and curiosity to know the religious facts, 
to engage with the texts and interpretations they arouse, especially those 
based on clinical psychoanalysis. 
Radical Evil and the Secular 
  Enlightenment’s secularisation refashioned morality which was until 
then dominated by religion.  For Kant, free will itself has a shadowy side:  it 
becomes "corrupted," losing the sense of the moral distinction between good 
and evil.  This is the "radical evil," which Hannah Arendt diagnoses in 
analysing totalitarianism and the Holocaust, when certain human beings 
declare others superfluous.  Pogroms, religious wars, ethnic conflicts, 
colonialism, amok . . .  Here we're touching on not only "threats to freedom," 
but also on what I will call the malignity of the psychic apparatus:  
destructivity, giving free rein to the death instinct--hallucinatory states, the 
move to savage acts, decapitations and kamikazes--in short, an inherent 
dimension of the human psyche.  This malignity may be to different degrees 
sublimated, worked through or contained in neurotic structures, explosive 
borderline conditions and "'as if' personalities."  Religions, which in the past, 
and in the best of cases, utilised and ritualised these states of unbinding, are 
now incapable of dealing with them.  Whereas the secular State needs 
strengthening, its “de-radicalisation centres" are virtually powerless.   
 At the Collège des Bernardins, a panel of religious and non-religious 
intellectuals have created the Montesquieu Circle to discuss our experiences 
and convictions regarding recent world events.  In this setting, I’ve spoken 
about my perspective on adolescents, unbinding, and the work we do at 
Cochin.  Borderline cases dominated by negativity do not spare female 
psychosexuality.  Some women cover themselves in burkinis, others are ready 
to procreate, or indeed, become human bombs themselves.  Our research on 
hysteria straddling psychosis, perversions, and false selves, among other 
illnesses, has not entered into the social arena, which remains unaware of or 
refuses to discuss it.   
     In a text I wrote some time ago, I proposed to think through an 
adolescent structure, outlined by Helen Deutch:  a fragile structure, a revision 
of the Oedipal one, entrenched in puberty's drives.12  But, when the belief in 
the absolute, the quest for an ideal, fails, this adolescent structure reverses 
itself in a destructive force against the self-with-the-other.  No link to any 
"object" survives for these "subjects" who are not subjects, only the death drive 
triumphs.13  
 Better than other approaches of the religious sort, the secular 
perspective is able to assure the passage from the need to believe to the desire to 
know—provided it has access to the proper means and tools.  Our priority 
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must be education, combined with a substantial increase in the status of a 
"teaching and training corps."  This arrangement would provide 
individualised support for psychosexual malaise, from the need to believe to the 
desire to know, in order to create a true path forward above the deepening 
abyss and the threat of war.  Media, culture, and politics should be offering 
new and attractive civic ideals.  Indeed, this should be the top priority of our 
hyperconnected globalised world; this alone — through shared cultural 
diversity — can protect humanity.  
The Abject and Abjection 
 In the case of the adolescent, the desire to know goes hand in hand with 
the need to believe.  This adolescent desire to invest the primal scene of the parents 
—a sexual curiosity and fulfilment—is demonstrated in the affirmation of 
homoeroticism and in the discovery of genitality.  Here, too, religions exercise 
their domination.  At the same time, parenthood today all too often exposes 
adolescents to severe psychic solitude, despite, or rather, because of the 
normalisation of hyperconnected information.14  Unbinding also resonates 
with the history of abjection in my practice.  This is a history I explored as early 
as 1980 in Powers of Horror:  An Essay on Abjection and at the time of the Louvre 
exhibit, The Severed Head: Capital Visions.15  In this context, "the image may be 
the only link with the sacred remaining to us:  with the horror provoked by 
death and sacrifice, with the serenity flowing from the pact of identification 
between sacrificed and sacrifiers, and with the joy of representation, which 
cannot be dissociated from sacrifice, its only possible trajectory."16  
"Abjection" or the abject is what is neither subject, nor object but unceasingly 
returns, disgusts, rejects, fascinates.  It is near but not able to be assimilated.  
Different from the uncanny, "abjection is elaborated through a failure to 
recognise its kin.”17  
 But there are many manners and degrees of unbinding.  A very 
conflictual relationship with the primary maternal figure often precedes the 
unbinding of adolescent structures:  submission, a swallowing up by maternal 
domination, a reduction of the subject to a hallucinatory state desiring avid 
satisfactions, on the border of psychosis and delirium.  There may be maternal 
domination and submission, which is, at one and the same time, rejected, fled, 
and also sought after, in order to be recovered once again in an all-powerful 
tyranny that is divine, irrevocable, and unquestionable.  What some call the 
"mass orthodoxy" of fundamentalist Islam finds in this its archaic cornerstone, 
so to speak. 
 I was listening to a desperate mother who lamented, "I was so close to 
my daughter, she told me everything, we were on the phone 24/7 and, all of 
a sudden, she disappeared.  She left to have a thousand children for jihadists"-
-is this not a flagrant example of abjection?  The young girl and her mother, 
too, have been invaded, cannibalised, without realising it--the daughter 
cannot stand this blurring of subject and object, which makes her “abject."  She 
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believes she's saving herself by giving herself over to abusive males, who 
reduce her to a motherhood that is imperative, absolute, and without doubt, 
victimising.  She will thus be every bit as devoid of subjectivity as before:  
abject.  
  The abjection that is the Bataclan tragedy (in November 2015, Paris) 
derives from the gangster fundamentalism of our ghettoised suburbs.  This 
delinquency, prime for radicalisation (so common in prisons) reveals that the 
religious treatment of revolt has discredited itself.  These young people do not 
adhere to the cultural values and republican ideals of their country.  Suffering 
from a lack of identity and social marginalisation, troubled youth might first 
embrace a "native identity" and, subsequently turn to forms of extremism.  
They are struggling with affective crises out of our reach, with no recourse to 
the questioning made available through language and thought.  Torn in 
pieces, they can no longer distinguish between good and evil.  Such a state 
destroys the possibility of gaining a sense of self and of the existence of others.  
The avidity for absolute satisfaction then takes the shape of the destruction of 
everything that is not this satisfaction--annihilating the boundary between 
self and other, interior and exterior:  "je/te tue--il/me tue."  Murder and suicide 
become blurred, as they did at the Bataclan. 
 My text on abjection came to me in the course of my analysis and 
through my scholarly writing.  I was in the process of preparing a book on 
Céline.18 It was hard to get a handle on the abyss opening up between my 
revolt against his anti-Semitic violence and the emotion which his fiction 
aroused in me.  His novels, from Voyage to the End of the Night to Castle to Castle, 
are a veritable "force of nature."  Borderline states, idiocy and brothel-speak, 
all are swept up in a prose as precise and classical as it is vernacular, musical, 
and vulgar.  Sentences persists in the ellipses, flooded by sensation, affect, and 
drives both horrible and sublime. But how to name this power of horror?  My 
mother was visiting France.  She took care of David who was teething and not 
sleeping at night and, for that matter, neither was I.  I'm on Ilse Barande's 
couch:  "I don't know how to manage all of it, the baby, my mother, and this 
Céline, with his Voyage to the End of the Night--tu parles!--all massacre, horror, 
abjection."  My analyst responds: "That's the word for it."  I leave the session 
relieved, with a feeling of deliverance more than the certainty of "mastering 
my subject."  It's the mother/child confusion, attraction/repulsion, the 
uncertainty of subjectivation and objectivation.  Sublimating or working 
through?  Clearly both.  Mary Douglas, the ethnologist, studied soiling and 
purification rites in so-called primitive societies.  So I took the word abjection, 
and tried to elucidate food taboos in Leviticus, Christian sins . . . even Céline. 
 Ilse Barande deserves to be better known.  Her writing on primary 
avidity, perversion, "mère-version" and also Le Maternel singulier should be 
reprinted.  My analyst, who was a German Jew, understood the word.  Yet, 
neither of us spoke French as our native language. Analysis takes shape in the 
lived experience of transference/counter-transference, if and only if it opens 
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us to a way of life and of thinking that is increasingly personal, attuned to the 
senses.  This was to lead me to write novels.  
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